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Theo A. F. Kuipers 
‘THISGRUE’ AND ‘THISEMERALD-PART’ 
REPLY TO JOHN WELCH 
I like John Welch’s contribution very much, not least because he deals with one 
of the famous Quinean examples, rabbits versus rabbit parts, in a way that 
confirms my impression that Quine could have expressed himself much more 
clearly than he in fact did. To be sure, that would not have stimulated so much 
exegesis of what he really meant. However, what is at least as important is that 
Welch demands attention to a problem underlying all “gruesome” problems, the 
classification problem. Of course, the fact that his solution is inspired by my 
solution of Goodman’s problem with the general grue hypothesis is also 
something I noted with pleasure. In this reply I first suggest an improved version 
of the classification problem and solution; I then raise a question about the 
claimed analogy with the Quinean problem. 
The Classification Problem 
Let me first state that I very much agree with Welch’s claim that the relevant 
general and predictive hypotheses presuppose a solution of the classification 
problem as soon as there is some relevant evidence for these hypotheses. 
Moreover, I also agree with the intuitive a priori claim that “This emerald is 
green” (THISGREEN) is more plausible than “This emerald is grue” 
(THISGRUE). But I have some reservations about his explication of this intuition 
and its defense. To be begin with the former, instead of his WIAc, at the end of 
Section 2: 
For all colors C and C', C z C', “This E is C ” is (much) more plausible than 
the conjunction “This EM is C” and “This EM  is C'” (which is equivalent to 
“This E is Q ” when C = G and C' = B).
I would prefer: 
For all colors C and C', C z C', “This E is C” is (much) more plausible than 
“This E is MC or 'MC ” (which is equivalent to “This E is Q” when C = G
and C' = B).
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For, in the standard example, Q is equivalent to the “disjunctive predicate” ‘MG
or MB ’, which makes the whole claim “This E is MG or MB ”  easy to interpret, 
whereas the conjunctive claim suggested by Welch is very difficult to interpret, at 
least for me.
Happily enough, I do not think that this point really weakens the 
argumentation in Section 3 in favor of either version of the prior problem. 
Moreover, regarding the posterior classification problem, the argument with 
respect to the relative likelihoods really seems to need a similar change. More 
specifically, the relevant evidential statement “This emerald looks both green and 
grue” should be replaced. In its present version it is formally equivalent to “This 
emerald looks both (MG or MG ) and (MG or MB ),” that is, “This emerald looks 
MG or ( MG and MB ),” and hence, assuming that B and G are incompatible, 
“This emerald looks MG,” which can hardly be intended. However, the intended 
version probably is “This emerald looks green or grue,” which formally amounts 
to “This emerald looks (MG or MG ) or (MG or MB ),” that is, “This emerald 
looks (MG or MG or MB ).” Indeed, as Welch attempts to argue for his reading, 
in my reading there does not seem to be a reason to assign a greater likelihood to 
THISGRUE relative to this evidence than to THISGREEN. 
As an aside, I should warn the reader that Welch’s claim early in Section 2 
that my theory of confirmation is Bayesian, though non-standard, is correct in the 
general sense that it fits into a Bayesian probabilistic framework. However his 
claim is not correct in the specific sense of my classification of principal theories 
of confirmation, also indicated by Welch, where “Bayes’ theory” is a specific 
kind of enabling inductive confirmation, viz. by inductive priors rather than 
inductive likelihoods.
‘Thisemerald-part’ versus ‘Thisrabbit-part’ 
As already suggested, I am pleased with Welch’s attempt to construe an analogy 
between, to be precise, the classificatory grue-problem and Quine’s reference 
problem with ‘Gavagai’. Although I think the main line of argument, essentially 
leading to a strong relativization of Quine’s indeterminacy claims, is basically 
correct, there may be one point of dispute at the very beginning. If a piece of 
emerald falls apart into a number of pieces (not too many), we would say that we 
have obtained that number of emeralds. However, rabbits now more viable ways 
of reproduction than falling apart. Hence the two types of examples may not be as 
similar as Welch suggests. I leave it to him to find out whether his interesting 
distinction between visual and tactile impressions strengthens or weakens the 
relevance of the evident distinction of the two cases. 
